This is my second response for my HIPS course. This time, it's regarding science and religion in ancient Greek philosophy. I didn't get any special recognition for my deconstruction last week, so I'm a bit miffed, but I understand, as the University of Chicago really likes its New Criticism paradigm.
Response 2: Separating Practices
The aphorisms of early Greek sages are without doubt eloquent—“Numbers constitute the whole universe” [1], “Just as our soul, being air, holds us together and controls us, so do breath and air surround the whole cosmos” [2], “Anaximander says that the stars are borne by the circles and spheres on which each one goes” [3]. Each of these ideas show seeds of the Western Thought, reaching out on natural, mystical, and philosophical motifs, but given the current divisions in science, religion, and philosophy, how exactly have these different areas diverged from a common source? Obviously, rigor, cosmological conviction, and speculation are all intricately intertwined in ancient Greek philosophy, so to explain science and religion independently is futile—science and religion can only be explained in relation to each other.
If we examine the Milesians and Pythagoreans, we see an elegant cosmology based on some sort of monism—be it Thales’s primordial water [4], Anaximene’s air [5], or Pythagoras’s numbers [1]. Although these are somewhat “natural” cosmologies as opposed to theistic origins (but this does not mean that there is not a place for a creator or creators), they are merely speculations that even Thales’s student Anaximander has labeled only as “stuff” [6]. These arguments are not “scientific” in a Popperian sense since they lack falsifiability, but they provide an important function to the early Greek philosophers: an origin of sorts, a design that allows individuals to find some sort of position in the vast universe. This was especially dear to the religious division of the Pythagoreans, the akousmatikoi—despite the fact that some of the teachings of Pythagoras, such as his white rooster superstition [7], are “unproved” [8].
The teleology of the universe is what drives religious speculation, but the Greeks also demanded justification, as per the rigor of the mathematikoi group of the Pythagoreans [9]. This justification provided was proto-scientific—for instance, Pythagoras experimented with mathematical proportions and wave vibrations and discovered the relation between harmony and number [10]. In fact, the term mathematikoi stems from mathema, meaning “study” or “learning,” and the mathematikoi applied the utmost rigor in their knowledge pursuits [9].
Once again, it must be stressed that these knowledge pursuits were religious in the end, as even the mathematikoi searched for further examples of their maxims regarding “the One” and “numbers consisting the universe” [11], but it is clear that there is a fundamental relationship between science and religion that cannot be severed to create separate disciplines in early Greek philosophy—religion provides a motivation for science, as science explains religion. Even though mixing these two disciplines in contemporary discourse is nothing short of controversial (cf. “Creation ‘Science’” and “Quantum Mysticism”), there is an eloquence in early Greek philosophy that stems from this combined pursuit of truth.
References
[1] Attributed to Pythagoras, quoted in Aristotle’s Metaphysics in pg 18 of Cohen’s Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy
[2] Attributed to Anaximenes, quoted by Aetius in pg 12 of Cohen’s Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy
[3] Quoted by Aetius in pg 11 of Cohen’s Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy
[4] Cohen et al. Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy, 9
[5] Cohen et al. Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy, 12
[6] Cohen et al. Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy, 10
[7] Quoted by Aristotle in pg 18 of Cohen’s Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy
[8] Quoted by Iamblichus in pg 17 of Cohen’s Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy
[9] Cohen et al. Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy, 15
[10] Quoted by Stobaeus in pg 20 of Cohen’s Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy
[11] Quoted by Aristotle in pg 18 of Cohen’s Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy
Text: Cohen, Curd, and Reeve (Eds). Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy. 3rd Ed. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc, 2005.
Showing posts with label philosophy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label philosophy. Show all posts
Monday, October 8, 2007
Monday, April 30, 2007
Fashionable Nonsense and Intellectual Imposters
It has come to my attention the works of one Stephen R. C. Hicks, Explaining Postmodernism: Skepticism and Socialism from Rousseau to Foucault, who has generously provided a sample of his text online (http://www.explainingpostmodernism.com/PostMod.pdf), attempts to attack postmodernism as a threat to liberal democracy.
This... is true. Somewhat. I have no arguments against the socialism that is rampant in the academic left and I am very clear about the fact that I enjoy (note: enjoy, not endorse) reading about academic socialism. And yes, there are many threats to liberal democracy that socialism can bring, such as political correctness and forced egalitarianism. HOWEVER, the issue I have with Hicks' text is the ad hominem attack he makes on postmodern epistemology, when it is clearly not (directly) related to the politics behind postmodernism (well... at least on a linear value level... but this is to be explained as well).
Hicks claims that the reason why relativism and anti-realism arose in the academic left was the failure of the socialist experiment and since academics relied so much on socialism, they were faced with two options--re-evaluate their political ideology or reject reality. Apparently, they chose the latter, crying out "reality is like sooo subjective anyway, so it's like totally not fair to talk about the USSR because it's like selective reality, you know?" Well, the problem with this notion is that Hicks traces the roots of postmodernism to many continental philosophers who do not share socialist or even egalitarian values. What he [Hicks] implies by doing this is that Nietzsche is a hippie and that Heidegger is a pinko commie (because the Nazis were sooo USSR, you know?) Furthermore, he attacks Kant as one of the fathers of PoMo Lit Crit Shit, which is just... wow, poor Kant.
Now, I agree with Hicks that there is a disparity between postmodern epistemology and the political ideology expressed by many in the postmodern movement. But, for crying out loud, what about me?! I mean, I'm a nihilistic solipsistic postmodernist, yet I still love capitalism and am considered a heartless libertarian!! I'd say, if anything, postmodernism fits more on a consequentialist libertarian paradigm (you know, the Friedmans, not the Enlightenment-values crowd) and a free-market allows for the creation and destruction of any power structure. Of course, the whole thing is that capitalism as it currently is is not a true descriptor of ideal capitalism (look at the structure created by big corporations and farm subsidies, for example). However, there is nothing more nihilistic than the free-market. But I digress.
What's kinda more abusive in his argument is the fact that he puts "objectivism" as the description of modernist metaphysics. It sounds kinda sketchy if you ask me; I'd consider empiricism more accurate than "objectivism" and it is well-known that Hicks consults Rand quite a bit...
The main problem is that most critiques of postmodernism end up as critiques of socialism and the critiques of dense language. I agree that clarity is not an important issue, but the ideas that postmodernism introduces--semi-solipsistic anti-realism (I say "semi" because there is at least some dependence on a social constructive view, which would imply more than one person) and extreme skepticism are not necessarily negligible arguments. If the attackers would actually address postmodern arguments instead of whining about socialism and linguistic obscurity, then I'd probably be more interested in what they have to say.
This... is true. Somewhat. I have no arguments against the socialism that is rampant in the academic left and I am very clear about the fact that I enjoy (note: enjoy, not endorse) reading about academic socialism. And yes, there are many threats to liberal democracy that socialism can bring, such as political correctness and forced egalitarianism. HOWEVER, the issue I have with Hicks' text is the ad hominem attack he makes on postmodern epistemology, when it is clearly not (directly) related to the politics behind postmodernism (well... at least on a linear value level... but this is to be explained as well).
Hicks claims that the reason why relativism and anti-realism arose in the academic left was the failure of the socialist experiment and since academics relied so much on socialism, they were faced with two options--re-evaluate their political ideology or reject reality. Apparently, they chose the latter, crying out "reality is like sooo subjective anyway, so it's like totally not fair to talk about the USSR because it's like selective reality, you know?" Well, the problem with this notion is that Hicks traces the roots of postmodernism to many continental philosophers who do not share socialist or even egalitarian values. What he [Hicks] implies by doing this is that Nietzsche is a hippie and that Heidegger is a pinko commie (because the Nazis were sooo USSR, you know?) Furthermore, he attacks Kant as one of the fathers of PoMo Lit Crit Shit, which is just... wow, poor Kant.
Now, I agree with Hicks that there is a disparity between postmodern epistemology and the political ideology expressed by many in the postmodern movement. But, for crying out loud, what about me?! I mean, I'm a nihilistic solipsistic postmodernist, yet I still love capitalism and am considered a heartless libertarian!! I'd say, if anything, postmodernism fits more on a consequentialist libertarian paradigm (you know, the Friedmans, not the Enlightenment-values crowd) and a free-market allows for the creation and destruction of any power structure. Of course, the whole thing is that capitalism as it currently is is not a true descriptor of ideal capitalism (look at the structure created by big corporations and farm subsidies, for example). However, there is nothing more nihilistic than the free-market. But I digress.
What's kinda more abusive in his argument is the fact that he puts "objectivism" as the description of modernist metaphysics. It sounds kinda sketchy if you ask me; I'd consider empiricism more accurate than "objectivism" and it is well-known that Hicks consults Rand quite a bit...
The main problem is that most critiques of postmodernism end up as critiques of socialism and the critiques of dense language. I agree that clarity is not an important issue, but the ideas that postmodernism introduces--semi-solipsistic anti-realism (I say "semi" because there is at least some dependence on a social constructive view, which would imply more than one person) and extreme skepticism are not necessarily negligible arguments. If the attackers would actually address postmodern arguments instead of whining about socialism and linguistic obscurity, then I'd probably be more interested in what they have to say.
Labels:
intellectual,
philosophy,
postmodernism
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